































Declining union density in many industrialized countries directs attention to alter-
native ways of labor relations and worker representation as, e.g., works councils.
German works councils belong to the most powerful worker representations in de-
veloped countries but little is known of their causal eect on productivity. A large
linked employer-employee panel is used to examine this issue. Comparing rms
with and without a works council I nd that rms with a works council are on
average 6.5 percent more productive. I present evidence that this estimate is the
lower bound to the causal productivity eect of works councils.
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1 Introduction
The present system of labor relations in the United States is part of the
\New Deal", initiated between 1933 and 1936 by President F.D. Roosevelt
as a reaction to the Great Depression. While strengthening workers' rights
when engaging in collective bargaining, the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935 (and its amendment, the Taft-Hartley act of 1947) prohibits the
formation of any form of employer-employee committee that has the power
to decide on working conditions and labor-management relations.1 As a
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ted from comments of Colin Cameron and Ann Hu Stevens. I thank
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1 See section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act.
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result, the present system of industrial relations contains union bargaining
but no mandatory or voluntary form of workplace representation. Low union
density2 recently raised doubts about whether this system still does a good
job and increased interest in alternative ways of employee representation at
the workplace. In the mid-nineties economists3 and politicians4 analyzed the
industrial relations system of European countries to learn which institutions
may help to improve the competitive position of the United States. The
debate passed without strengthening employees' participation rights in the
National Labor Relations Act { possibly due to the uncertainty about the
economic consequences of formalized participation.
The most prominent example of non-union workers' participation in Eu-
ropean countries is employee representation via works councils. Rogers and
Streeck (1995) dene works councils as \institutionalized bodies for repre-
sentative communication between a single employer and the employees of a
single plant or enterprise". Works councils are designed to give workers a
collective voice and to increase workplace democracy. But they do more:
many studies show that they positively contribute to a society's regulatory
performance by enforcing commitment to legal standards regarding, e.g., en-
vironmental protection (Askildsen et al. (2006)), gender equality (Heywood
and Jirjahn (2009)), and health and safety (Weil (1999)).
Given the positive social eects of works councils as mentioned above, a
society is better of with works councils if councils increase productivity. Even
if works councils are permitted by law and even if employers and workers
knew that a works council would increase productivity, expected distribu-
tional con
icts at the rm level can obstruct their foundation (Freeman and
Lazear (1995)). Hence, if a society desires to have strong works councils, it
has to make them mandatory.
The hypothesis of increased rm productivity through works councils
mainly rests on the assumption that they improve communication between
management and workers. Works councils can be an important source of in-
formation for managers helping them to improve the quality of their decisions.
Also, councils may be able to motivate both parties to make longer-term com-
mitments (Freeman and Lazear (1995)) and, hence, increase the probability
2 The share of union members among private sector workers decreased from 24.2 percent
in 1983 to 7.6 percent in 2008, see Hirsch and Macpherson (2009).
3 Rogers and Streeck (1995) published an in
uential book on works councils. This
book is one outcome of the comprehensive NBER project \Working and Earning under
Dierent Rules: What the United States Can Learn from Labor Market Institutions in
Other Developed Countries" by Richard B. Freeman.
4 See e.g. the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (\Dunlop
Commission") initiated by the U.S. Department of Labor, nal report (1994).1 Introduction 3
of workers' concessions in economically dicult times and of higher invest-
ments in rm-specic human capital. Smith (1991) argues that employee
participation may reduce opportunistic behavior of managers. However, a
works council may also worsen performance. Depending on the specic de-
sign of the council's rights, managers may have to consult it or have to come
to an agreement with it in situations where fast decision-making is necessary.
If councils have co-determination rights, they can block decisions. Therefore,
from a theoretical point of view, the productivity eect of works councils is
unclear.
Because mandated works councils do not exist in the United States, the
productivity eect of councils can only be estimated for other countries. Nev-
ertheless, if the eect is positive there { maybe United States can learn from
that. German works councils belong to the most powerful ones in Europe
(see Streeck and Vitols (1995 p. 270) or Streeck (1995) for a comparison of
European works councils) and most empirical studies found a non-negative
productivity eect (see Addison et al. (2004) for a survey). But, since existing
data do not include direct information on capital stock, inference regarding
the productivity eect of works councils is conditional on the assumption
that capital stock does not matter. Previous results contain a wide variety
in the estimated council eect, including obviously implausible \productivity
eects" of up to 30 percent.
This contribution studies whether works councils increase or decrease the
productivity of German establishments. In order to estimate the productivity
eect, in a rst step, value added is regressed on capital and labor inputs
with a GMM-SYS estimator to address endogeneity issues. In a second step,
the residuals of step 1 are regressed on rm characteristics. At this second
stage, an Oaxaca-Blinder-decomposition of the output dierential of rms
with and without a council is used to estimate the productivity eect. Finally,
an endogenous switching regression model is applied to check for unobserved
mechanisms that, simultaneously, may explain productivity and self-selection
into the observed works council status.
I nd a positive impact of councils on rm productivity of 6.5 percent.
However, I do not claim this gure to be the causal eect of council existence
on productivity. Rather I present empirical evidence and additional theoret-
ical arguments that this gure is the lower bound to the causal productivity
eect. The conclusion is that works councils, embedded in an appropriate
system of industrial relations, have no negative impact on productivity.2 German Works Councils 4
2 German Works Councils
In Germany, the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) is the
legal base for works councils. Workers have the right to establish a council
in rms with at least ve employees. Hence, works councils are mandatory
but not automatic. The employer bears the expenses for the election and
other costs the council causes. Works council members are elected for four
years and enjoy strong employment protection. For rms with more than 200
employees, at least one councillor acts as a full-time councillor. The larger
the rm, the higher is the number of works councillors and the stronger are
their rights.
In general, council rights are weaker with regard to nancial and economic
aairs and stronger in personnel matters and social concerns. Explicitly, the
Works Constitution Act (WCA) gives councils co-determination rights in the
eld of workers' health and safety and of social and personnel matters such as,
e.g., the introduction of new payment methods, the regulation of overtime,
recruitment guidelines, transfers, and dismissals. Furthermore, they have
information and consultation rights in nancial matters, personnel planning,
and with respect to changes in the work environment and the adoption of
new technologies.
The WCA not only determines the rights of councils, it also obliges coun-
cillors to cooperate with the management. Councils and management should
act in \a sprit of mutual trust", \in cooperation with union and employer
organizations" and \to the benet of the employees and of the establish-
ment" (WCA, Section 2). It is also determined that councils have no wage
bargaining power and no right to call a strike and that the work of the
union is not restricted by the WCA. Hence, the German system of indus-
trial relations consists of two parts. While unions have the exclusive right
of industry-wide collective bargaining, works councils are the designed to be
the collective voice w.r.t. work place conditions for all workers in a specic
plant or establishment, regardless of whether they are union members or not
or whether their establishment is covered by collective bargaining. Although
works councils and unions are formally independent, most works councillors
are union members or have close ties to a union. Unions devote expertise and
nancial resources to councils, while works councillors often actively recruit
new union members (Streeck (1995) p. 335).3 Literature 5
3 Literature
3.1 How can works councils aect productivity?
Councils act as the collective voice and as the ear of the workers and are able
to reduce information asymmetries between labor and management. Man-
agement may, e.g., misinform workers about the true economic state of the
rm to extract higher eort. Anticipating such strategies, workers may dis-
trust management information, even if it is truthful. Councils with legal
information rights are able to act as workers' ear by verifying such infor-
mation and thus may be able to solve or at least reduce the communication
problem (see e.g. Rogers and Streeck (1995)).
As their collective voice, councils communicate workers' preferences to
the management. Consultation rights commit the employer to listen to
this voice and to consult the council prior to intended changes. Additionally,
formal consultation provides a forum for both sides to nd new solutions
to problems and this may help managers to improve the quality of their
decisions. If a council has co-determination rights on a particular matter,
its agreement is necessary for a decision.
Giving workers a voice and letting them articulate dissatisfaction will
reduce costly quits (see Hirschman (1970)). Several studies found a decrease
in personnel turnover in case of works council presence (see e.g. Frick (1996)
or Addison et al. (2001)) supporting a reduced exit propensity.
Section 80 of the WCA calls upon councils to enforce the legal rights of
workers at the rm level. The strong employment protection legislation,5
co-determination rights, and the council's support to workers (e.g. legal ad-
vice) have the potential to considerably hinder displacements.6 As a result,
workers and management may make longer-term commitments which would,
e.g., decrease the hold-up problem of investing in rm-specic human capital.
Of course, all those positive eects can be costly. If councillors do not
work in a \spirit of mutual trust" and \to the benet of the rm" as de-
manded by the WCA, they are able to deteriorate rms' performance. But
even if councils are cooperative, some of their characteristics are inherently
productivity decreasing. Informing a council takes time, and, worse, consul-
tation takes time before a decision can be made and this can result in the
5 According to the overall employment protection index of the OECD (see OECD (2004)
chart 2.1), 18 out of 28 countries have less strict regularities than Germany.
6 A methodological implication of increased employment protection through works coun-
cils is that workers could tend to erect a works council in times of bad rm performance
to save their jobs. This kind of self selection will lead to a downward bias in the estimated
eect of council existence on rm productivity.4 Data 6
loss of protable opportunities. Co-determination can lead to a suboptimal
allocation of a rm's resources and, of course, having a secure working place
also may create incentives for moral hazard. In sum, whether the benets of
councils outweigh the costs is an empirical question.
3.2 Empirical Results
To asses the productivity eects of German works councils, mainly two large-
scale data sets have been used so far,7 the IAB Establishment Panel8 (e.g. Ad-
dison et al. (2006), Frick and Moeller (2003), Schank et al. (2002), Wolf and
Zwick (2002)) and the Hannover Panel9 (e.g. Addison et al. (2001), Huebler
and Jirjahn (2003), Jirjahn (2003)).
Generally, the estimated productivity eect of councils is non-negative,
ranging from insignicant eects close to zero (Addison et al. (2006); Schank
et al. (2002)) to large eects (i.e. around 15 percent in Addison et al. (2001)
and Wolf and Zwick (2002); up to 30 percent in Frick and Moeller (2003)
and Addison et al. (2006)). All studies with large productivity estimates
applied OLS, while those which estimated a zero eect used the xed eects
estimator. The dierence can be explained with unobserved heterogeneity
that leads to upwards biased OLS estimates.
However, this does not mean that the insignicant estimates close to
zero are necessarily correct. A xed eects estimator only uses within-rm
variations to identify partial eects. Few rms establish or close a council
(see e.g. Addison et al. (2006)) and this may explain the insignicance of the
eect. Also, changes in the council regime may have no immediate eects on
productivity.
Existing studies on councils' productivity eect only crudely control for
capital stock.10 Further problems with respect to the sample selection of pre-
vious studies are described below. Addressing these problems, I test whether
works councils deteriorate rm productivity. My empirical strategy allows
for causal inference.
4 Data
This analysis is based on the Linked Employer-Employee Panel of the In-
stitute for Employment Research (IAB). In the data set, administrative in-
7 See Addison et al. (2004) for an overview over the results from small-scale data sets.
8 See http://www.iab.de/de/erhebungen/iab-betriebspanel.aspx.
9 Observations from 1994{1997, meanwhile part of the IAB Establishment Panel.
10 See Mueller (2008) for a discussion of capital stock approximation.4 Data 7
formation on employees is matched with survey information on rms. The
survey unit is the establishment or local production unit, rather than the
legal and commercial entity of the company.
4.1 Sample Selection
I restrict the analysis to the manufacturing sector. Since works council rights
increase if a rm has more than 20 employees, I drop all rms that have less
than 21 employees in at least one of the periods under consideration. The
probability of works council existence increases with rm size: while only
about half of the rms with 21 to 100 employees have a council, this share
is about 99 percent in the group of manufacturing rms with more than 300
employees. An objection against former studies which neglect the correlation
between rm size and council probability is that the measured productivity
eect is biased due to unobserved eects that are correlated with rm size.
To avoid this potential weakness, my analysis is conned to rms with, at
the maximum, 300 workers. A dummy for rms with less than 101 workers
is also included in regression.
Since the reform of the WCA in 2001 implies substantial changes in the
council rights, I only consider the period from 2001 to 2005 and end up with
2,879 rm-year observations on 1,086 dierent rms.
4.2 Variables
Because dierent rms will produce output using dierent shares of interme-
diate inputs, value added is a better approximation for economic performance
than total sales and is used as the dependent variable in the production
function. Value added is regressed on works council presence, the number of
employees and the value of the capital stock.11 The other control variables
are the percentages of part-time workers, apprentices and skilled workers12 in
total employment, whether the rm is covered by collective bargaining, the
number of persons participating in employer-supported training programs,
industry aliation, location in East or West Germany, a dummy indicating
whether the rm has between 21 and 100 employees, the state of technology,
the indication whether the rm exports and whether it belongs to a group
11 The data does not contain direct information on the capital stock. I use an approach
by Mueller (2008) to compute the capital stock from investment data.
12 Skilled workers are craftsmen who have at least two years of formal professional edu-
cation, or other employees who perform qualied tasks, i.e. also university graduates are
included in that group.5 Empirical Model 8
of aliated companies.13
The theoretical considerations in the previous section indicate that losses
of rm-specic human capital due to personnel 
uctuation may be important
for productivity and related to council existence. The regressor \number of
employees" controls for changes in the total amount of labor used in produc-
tion. However, it does not control for 
uctuations that leave the level of total
employment unaected. To deal with this, the churning rate is taken as an
additional measure of 
uctuation (see Burgess et al. (2000)).14 The churning
rate is a measure for separations that lead to replacement hirings and thus
indicates 
uctuations that do not aect total employment.
5 Empirical Model
5.1 The Production Function
I base my analysis on a Cobb-Douglas production function that contains
value added (Y), labor (L), capital (K), works council presence, and the
other above mentioned control variables.
The static Cobb-Douglas specication is:
ln(Yit) = ln(Lit) + ln(Kit) + 
0Zit + i + mt + it (1)
with
it = i;t 1 + it
where i is a rm-specic xed eect, mt captures time eects that are
common to all rms, it is an idiosyncratic and possibly autoregressive pro-
ductivity shock, it is a white noise error term,  and  are the output
elasticities w.r.t. labor and capital, and 0 is a vector of coecients on Zit,
the vector of control variables. Note that some of the control variables are
time-invariant or at least nearly time-invariant.
A dynamic representation of equation 1 is
ln(Yit) = ln(Lit)   ln(Li;t 1) + ln(Kit)   ln(Ki;t 1) +
ln(Yi;t 1) + ln(Zit)   ln(Zi;t 1) +
(1   )(i) + (mt   mt 1) + it (2)
13 Summary statistics of the rm-specic means are presented in table 2 on page 16.
14 The churning rate is the dierence between the total work 
ow rate (WF) minus the
absolute value of the net change rate (NET) in employment. WF is the share of hired
(WIF) plus the share of displaced workers in total employment (WOF), and NET =
WIF   WOF.5 Empirical Model 9
where the possibly autoregressive nature of productivity shocks is explicitly
modeled and therewith removed from the error term. The static specication
in equation 1 is a special case of equation 2. Both equations coincide if 
is zero. In order to consider the more general case, I estimate the dynamic
specication.
5.2 Endogeneity and Time-Invariance
When estimating a production function, one generally faces the problems of
simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity. Additionally, when estimating
works council eects, one has to be aware of the time invariance of the council
status.
From an econometrician's perspective, the simultaneity problem is a cor-
relation of the time-varying part of the error term with one or more ex-
planatory variables (typically with labor and capital). Similarly, unobserved
heterogeneity can be viewed as a correlation of the time-invariant part of the
error term with one or more explanatory variables. One way around both
problems is to use lagged dierences of the endogenous regressors to instru-
ment their levels. Unfortunately, lagged dierences are often only weakly
correlated with the original regressor. To overcome this problem, Arellano
and Bover (1995) proposed to additionally estimate the model in rst dier-
ences and instrument with lagged levels. In that case, problems arise if the
researcher is interested in estimating the coecients of nearly time-invariant
regressors (e.g. works council existence) or, even worse, totally time-invariant
regressors because any dierences of time-invariant regressors are zero and,
therefore, no variation remains to identify their coecients.
However, the situation of endogeneity and time-invariance is manageable
using a two-staged approach, as, e.g., applied in Black and Lynch (2001).
In a rst step, value added is regressed on the variable inputs while { as
described above { internal instruments are used to deal with the potential
endogeneity of the regressors. The residuals of that rst step regression are
averaged within rms and used as dependent variable in a second step. In
that second step, the averaged residuals are regressed on the remaining time-
invariant regressors. As a result, coecients of time-invariant regressors can
be estimated while one has controlled for the endogeneity of the variable
inputs. However, if the time-invariant regressors are themselves endogenous,
their coecients may be still biased.
In my study, the regressors in Zit are time-invariant or nearly time-
invariant. I construct the within-rm averages of the nearly time-invariant
regressors and use these averages together with the time-invariant regressors
as explanatory variables in the second step. Next, both steps are explained5 Empirical Model 10
in more detail.
5.2.1 First-Step Estimation
Natural candidate instruments for the variable input factors labor and capital
are lagged dierences of the regressors because they are correlated with the
regressor but are assumed to be exogenous. The more lags are used, the more
ecient is the estimate but the smaller is the sample size. Because I have
only a short panel of ve years, classical IV-style instruments are inadequate.
A way around this problem is to use GMM style instruments as proposed by
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988).
With these instruments, equation 2 can be estimated consistently with the
system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and which was rst applied to a production function estimation by Blundell
and Bond (2000). To improve eciency, the GMM-SYS estimator estimates
a system of a rst-dierenced and a level equation. It uses lagged levels
of the endogenous variables as instruments in the rst dierenced equation.
Additionally, lagged dierences are used to instrument the regressors in the
level equation.
5.2.2 Second Step Estimation
The dependent variable for the second step is the xed eect of each rm. To
obtain it, I rst generate the predicted values for value added and subtract
it from the observed values15
ln(Yit)   [\ ln(Yit)] = (1   )(
0Zi + i) + errorit: (3)
I then average that value over the period 2001{2005 for each establishment to
get an estimate of the rm-specic time-invariant component of the rst step
residual, i.e. (1 )(0Zi +i). If error is a zero mean error term, averaging
over time will eliminate or at least substantially reduce its contribution to
the residual.
The second step estimation equation is
Ri = 






t ln(Y )it   [ \ ln(Y )it]
1   
:
15 Note, because Z contains now only time-invariant regressors, it varies only between
rms and the equation simplies.5 Empirical Model 11
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
An interesting alternative to estimating equation 4 directly with OLS is
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, introduced by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973): the output dierential between two groups can be decomposed into
explained and unexplained components. The output dierential between
rms with a council (C) and rms without (N) can be partitioned in either
of the two following ways:
RC   RN = C(ZC   ZN) + ZN(C   N) + (errorC   errorN) (5)
or
RC   RN = N(ZC   ZN) + ZC(C   N) + (errorC   errorN) (6)
where, for clarity, the rm subscript has been dropped. RC   RN is
the mean output dierential, ZC and ZN are vectors of mean values of the
independent variables (including an intercept) and C and N are estimated
coecient vectors. Equation 5 says that the output dierential can be decom-
posed into a part due to dierences in endowments evaluated at the council
rms' coecients and a part due to dierences in coecients evaluated at the
means of the group without councils. The rst part of the equation 5 can be
interpreted as the dierence in output the council group would achieve if it
had the other group's endowments, i.e. the explained part of the output gap.
The second part represents the dierence in output the group without coun-
cils would experience if it had the same productivity as the council group,
i.e. the unexplained part or, if assuming random assignment of councils to
rms, the average treatment eect on the non-treated.
In the second term of equation 6 the productivity dierences are evaluated
at the council group's means. Assuming random assignment of councils to
rms, this term is the average treatment eect on the treated, indicating the
dierence in output the council group would experience if it had no council.
This is the eect I estimate below.
Following an idea of Winsborough and Dickenson (1971), the treatment
eect on the treated can be estimated using a threefold decomposition of the
output dierential:
RN   RC = C(ZN   ZC)
+ZC(N   C)
+(N   C)(ZN   ZC): (7)5 Empirical Model 12
While the unexplained part in the second line is the desired treatment
eect on the actually treated rms,16 the third term indicates whether, e.g.,
the council rms accumulate more of such endowments for which they have
a productivity advantage (compared to the other group) or not.
Self-Selection into Works Council Regimes
Workers have the right to establish or close a works council. Hence, they
select their rm into one of two possible regimes, i.e. into having a council
or not. If the self-selection mechanism is systematically related to the rms'
productivity, OLS estimates of the council eect and the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition are biased. However, for at least some self-selection patterns
the direction of the OLS bias is clear.
Consider the case where there are unobserved factors that increase the
incentives of workers to establish or maintain a works council and, at the
same time, are negatively correlated with productivity. In that case, ran-
dom assignment of councils to rms would increase the output dierential.
Applying the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to an output dierential that is
too small leads to underestimation of the council eect. In the following it
is brie
y shown how to adjust the output dierential.
The self-selection into a works council regime can be described by an
endogenous switching regression model.17 If the utility of having a council is
higher than its costs, workers will choose to maintain a works council. Even
though the utility cannot be observed by the researcher, the workers' choices
are observed. The endogenous switching regression model can be estimated
using the Heckman two-step estimator (see Heckman (1979)). The latent






0Ii + ui (8)
with Zi as the vector of second step regressors from equation 4, Ii as a vector
of external instruments, 
0 and 0 as coecient vectors and ui as a random
error. The observed choices are
W = 1 if W
 > 0
W = 0 if W
  0
16 Note, this decomposition leads to a negative output dierential. Hence, the second
term is negative if the council rms have a productivity advantage. This could be inter-
preted as the output reduction that they would experience if they close the council.
17 Also called \Roy Model", see, e.g., Maddala (1983).5 Empirical Model 13
with W as a dummy indicating the presence of a works council. The output
equations can be estimated consistently with





0Zi + ^ 0Ii)
(^ 
0Zi + ^ 0Ii)

+ Ci if W = 1 (9)






0Zi + ^ 0Ii)
1   (^ 
0Zi + ^ 0Ii)

+ Ni if W = 0 (10)
where ^ 
0Zi + ^ 0Ii is the predicted probability of having a works council from
equation 8, (^ 
0Zi + ^ 0Ii) is the density function evaluated at ^ 
0Zi + ^ 0Ii and
(^ 
0Zi + ^ 0Ii) is the cumulative distribution function at this point.18 Hence,
the expressions after C and N are the inverse Mills' ratios, accounting for
the non-random selection of works council regimes.
After having estimated equations 9 and 10, the output dierential (RN  















from both sides of the respective equation. Hence, the selectivity-corrected
dependent variables are R

















. Imitating random assignment of works councils, the
corrected output dierential (R
N   R
C) is decomposed using equation 7.19
Although the endogenous switching regression model is identied through
nonlinearities, additional instruments will improve identication. Appropri-
ate instruments have to be uncorrelated with the errors in equations 8, 9,
and 10 but should explain as much variation in W as possible.
Acknowledging that valid instruments are hard to nd, I choose the in-
dustry share of rms having a works council as a technical instrument. Ad-
ditionally, I construct two instruments from the data's employee dimension
that re
ect worker heterogeneity within rms. The rst heterogeneity mea-
sure is the within rm standard deviation in workers age. The other is the
Herndahl Index of four groups of employees: blue vs. white collar workers
by gender. As a homogenous work force is assumed to agree more easily on
electing and running a works council,20 I expect the heterogeneity measures
to be negatively correlated with council existence. The industry share is by
construction positively correlated with council existence. Empirical evidence
is presented in the next section.
18 For consistency of the endogenous switching regression model one has to assume that
ui, Ci and Ni follow a trivariate normal distribution.
19 See Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) for a methodological analysis of decompositions with
selectivity corrected equations.
20 See Freeman and Medo (1984) and Demsetz (1993) for a discussion of worker het-
erogeneity and union representation elections.6 Results 14
Tab. 1: Production function estimation of manufacturing rms for
the years 2001{2005 using the GMM-SYS estimator
Variable Coecient (Std.Error)
L1.log(value added) 0.290*** (0.065)
log(number of employees) 0.754** (0.350)
L1.log(number of employees) -0.228 (0.377)
log(capital stock) 0.487*** (0.163)




Note: Robust standard errors. **,*** denote signicance at the 0.05 and
0.01 level, respectively, and L1 is the one-period lag operator. Year dummies
are included.
Assuming valid instruments, the productivity eect from estimating equa-
tion 7 with the adjusted dependent variables is the average treatment eect of
council existence, while estimating equation 7 with the unadjusted variables
gives the treatment eect on those who actually choose to have a council.
However, using non-experimental data, one can rarely be sure that an in-
strument is uncorrelated with the error terms in the outcome equations. To
check robustness of the estimated selectivity pattern, I will apply a number
of specications of the endogenous switching model using a variety of dier-
ent instruments to equation 8. Of course, each specication will produce its
own selectivity-corrected output dierential and, therefore, its own estimate
for the average treatment eect. Instead of interpreting one of the resulting
point estimates as the average treatment eect, I will only check whether they
are higher or lower than the estimate from the unadjusted decomposition. If
they are higher, I interpret the estimate from the unadjusted decomposition
as the lower bound to the unknown average treatment eect.
6 Results
6.1 First-Step Results
The results in table 1 show short-run output elasticities of 0.75 w.r.t. labor
and 0.49 w.r.t. capital.21 The long-run elasticities are 0.75 for labor and 0.26
21 I used twice and more lagged levels of the output variable, threefold lagged levels of
the input variables and simple lagged levels of time dummies as instruments in the rst6 Results 15
for capital, and all estimated parameters except the one for the lagged labor
input are highly signicant.
After having controlled for capital and labor, the (unadjusted) output
dierential RC   RN amounts to 19.4 percent, indicating that rms with a
works council produce ceteris paribus on average 19.4 percent more value
added. This is not interpretable as a productivity eect of works councils
because other rm characteristics have not been controlled for so far.
6.2 Second-Step Results
The second-step estimations are used to obtain the productivity eect. Table
2 shows descriptive statistics of the second step variables.
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
The decomposition results are presented in table 3.22 Two third of the out-
put dierential can be explained by dierent endowments and interaction
eects. The unexplained part amounts to 6.5 percent and re
ects a higher
productivity of works council rms; i.e. after having controlled for all avail-
able information (but not for self-selection), council rms create on average
6.5 percent more value added.23
The central result is the positive 6.5 percent productivity eect of works
councils on the actually treated rms.24 In the following it is discussed why
this is the lower bound to the average treatment eect.
Underestimation of the Council Eect
There are econometric and economic arguments for considering the estimated
dierenced equation. For the levels equation, once lagged rst dierences of the output
variable and twice lagged rst dierences of the input regressors are used as instruments.
To improve eciency, instruments are drawn from all past waves of the IAB Establishment
Panel starting in 1993. The total amount of instruments is 96 and the Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions suggests no misspecication of the model (Prob > chi2 = 0:20).
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the rst-dierenced errors does not reject
the hypothesis of no autocorrelation (Prob > z = 0:21).
22 The decomposition is conducted using the \Oaxaca" command in Stata. For the
computation of the standard errors see Jann (2009).
23 Being aware of the criticism of Jones (1983), I will not interpret the contribution of
each regressor to the unexplained part.
24 As a robustness check, I dropped one or more second step regressors arbitrarily and
repeated the decomposition. The resulting productivity eects are of similar magnitude
and never below 6.5 percent.6 Results 16
Tab. 2: Summary statistics of 2nd-step variables
Works Council No Works Council
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
average residual from rst- 0.07 0.60 -0.13 0.61
step GMM-SYS estimation
Churning rate (percent) 2.66 2.29 4.29 7.09
Covered by collective 0.72 0.39 0.30 0.38
bargaining (yes = 1)
East Germany (yes = 1) 0.39 0.49 0.57 0.50
State of technology (index: 1 = 2.27 0.65 2.13 0.58
state of the art; 5 = obsolescent)
Percentage of part-time workers 5.60 7.17 9.14 11.40
Percentage of temporary workers 3.44 6.58 2.29 4.62
Percentage of apprentices 4.25 3.62 6.22 5.90
Percentage of skilled workers 76.96 22.72 77.53 23.79
Exporter (yes = 1) 0.75 0.38 0.55 0.45
Does not belong to a group of 0.69 0.41 0.84 0.31
aliated rms (yes = 1)
Percentage of workers partici- 18.73 18.15 14.82 16.27
pating in training programs
Observations 560 488
Note: The means are averages over the years 2001 to 2005. The average
residual is measured in logs. Compared to the 1086 observations in the rst
step I lose 38 observations due to missing values in the second step variables.
productivity eect on the treated of 6.5 percent as a lower bound to the true
eect. The economic argument stems from the well-known phenomenon of
decreasing productivity during cyclical downturns due to labor hoarding.
Labor hoarding means that rms do not fully adjust their labor input to
decreasing production. The consequence is a lower capacity utilization and
therefore a lower productivity. The period under examination in this study
(2001{2005) is characterized by a cyclical downturn of the German econ-
omy with an average annual growth rate of real GDP in the manufacturing
sector of 1.5 percent, while in 2000 and 2006 growth rates were around 7
percent.25 Assuming that stronger employment protection in works council
rms increases labor hoarding, the productivity eect of councils is higher in
cyclical upturns and is therefore underestimated in this study.
25 German Federal Statistical Oce (2008)6 Results 17
Tab. 3: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
Variable Coecient (Std.Err.)
Unadjusted Dierential
Prediction with council 0.066*** (0.026)
Prediction without council -0.127*** (0.028)





Notes: *** denotes signicance at the 0.01 level. Positive numbers for the
decomposition results indicate advantages for the council group. Decompo-
sition evaluated at the council rms' endowments.
From a econometric point of view, self-selection into the works council
regime is found to be the main reason why my results are only lower bounds
to the true average treatment eect. The results with selectivity correction
presented in table 4 show that random assignment of works councils to rms
increases the output dierential and the estimated productivity eect. These
results are estimated with dierent combinations of the following instruments
in the selection equation 8 (the rst gure in parentheses is the pairwise
correlation coecient with council existence and the second gure is the
associated p-value for a test of the hypothesis that this correlation coecient
is equal to zero):
1. SHARE: = industry share of works council rms (0.160; 0.000)
2. AGE: = within-rm standard deviation of employees' age (-0.194; 0.0000)
3. HERF: = Herndahl Index of the within-rm shares of four groups of
employees26(-0.094; 0.000).
As discussed in more detail in the previous section, the rst instrument is
a standard technical instrument and the two other instruments re
ect worker
heterogeneity within rms. The reported signs for the correlation coecients
with council existence coincide with a priori expectations: rms with a high
degree of heterogeneity in workers age or in the blue vs. white collar and
gender dimensions are signicantly less likely to have a council.
26 Sum over the squared shares of blue collar males, blue collar females, white collar
males and white collar females in total employment.6 Results 18
Table 4 shows the adjusted output dierentials from endogenous switch-
ing regression models and the corresponding decomposition results for dif-
ferent combinations of instruments. While there is some variation in the
productivity eect, the general direction is obvious. The adjusted output
gap as well as the productivity eect are clearly higher than the estimates
from the unadjusted case ( for the latter see table 3). This change in the
results occurs because both i are estimated to be negative.27 With negative
i, it can directly be seen from equations 9 and 10 that the average rm in
the council group would perform poorer than the average rm in the whole
sample would do, provided that both have a council or both have no coun-
cil.28 This is an important additional insight and can be explained by the
councils' oer of employment protection { workers of poorly performing rms
may choose to maintain a council to protect their rents (for a discussion see
Jirjahn (2009)).29
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the diculties in nding appropriate in-
struments, there is good reason to be very careful in interpreting the gures
presented in table 4. All I claim here is that the true productivity eect is
higher than the not selectivity-corrected productivity estimate of 6.5 percent
and I do not claim to what extent this may be the case.
Tab. 4: Selection Adjustment
Instrument SHARE AGE HERF ALL
Adjusted output gap 0.31 (0.00) 0.52 (0.00) 0.52 (0.00) 0.40 (0.00)
Productivity eect 0.26 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00) 0.68 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00)
Notes: p-values in parentheses. For the estimates reported in the last column
all three instruments are jointly used in the selection equation.
27 Jirjahn (2009) nds the same selection pattern.
28 In contrast to the interpretation of the classical Roy Model it is impossible to conclude
from both i being negative that both types of rms are better of with the council regime
they are in. This is because in the Roy Model the agents behave optimal with respect
to their outcomes (earnings) while workers in my model do not necessarily care about
productivity when deciding about works council existence.
29 As another check for robustness, the endogenous switching regression model is esti-
mated via full information maximum likelihood. Regardless of the combination of instru-
ments, the correlations of the error terms of the output equations with the error of the
selection equation are negative and hence, both i in equations 9 and 10 are negative.7 Summary 19
7 Summary
Most economists expect non-union participation of employees in rm-level
decision-making to have desirable social eects, such as workplace democ-
racy or the enforcement of legal standards in working conditions and envi-
ronmental protection. However, there is no unambiguous empirical evidence
about the economic eciency of such participation. I examine German works
councils as a prominent example of non-union participation to assess their
in
uence on rm productivity.
Data on roughly 1,050 small to medium-sized manufacturing rms is
taken from the 2001{2005 waves of the Linked Employer-Employee Panel
of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). A GMM-SYS estimator
addresses the endogeneity of capital and labor in the production function.
After controlling for capital and labor, I decompose the remaining output
dierential between rms with a council and rms without a council into
explained and unexplained parts and estimate a positive productivity ef-
fect of council existence of 6.5 percent. However, this is the eect for rms
whose workers actually choose to maintain a works council. An endogenous
switching regression model controls for self-selection into the council regime
and mimics random assignment of councils to rms. Its results and further
economic and empirical arguments indicate that the estimated eect of 6.5
percent is the lower bound to the average treatment eect.
This study shows that it is possible to design a system of industrial re-
lations where works councils improve the productivity of rms. Theoretical
studies (Freeman and Lazear (1995)) and empirical studies (Huebler and Jir-
jahn (2003)) showed that the productivity eect of works councils increases
if distributional con
icts are worked out on a higher level than the rm level.
Hence, industries in the Unites States that have centralized wage bargaining
for a group of rms or an industry (like e.g. the automobile industry) could
benet from mandatory works councils { given that unions concentrate on
bargaining and works councils focus on working conditions.
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